

25 OCT 1973

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1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP84T00175R00040004-0

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
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
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(VOL. XXIV, NO. 44)

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ARAB - ISRAELI WAR

USSR JUSTIFIES CEASE-FIRE CALL, SCORES ISRAELI "VIOLATIONS"

Moscow media showed circumspection regarding Soviet diplomatic activity preceding the adoption on 22 October of the Security Council resolution calling for a cease-fire in the Arab-Israeli war. Thus, Kosygin's secret talks in Cairo, from 16 to 19 October, were reported only after he returned to the Soviet capital. Reports of Kissinger's trip to Moscow on the 20th to confer with Brezhnev did not indicate that it was taken at Soviet initiative. And Moscow made no official announcement that it had cosponsored the cease-fire resolution, merely reporting the White House announcement that the United States and the USSR had reached agreement regarding a joint resolution to be placed before the Security Council.

The immediate breakdown of the cease-fire, which had been accepted on the 22d by the Egyptians and Israelis, brought a Soviet Government statement on the 23d placing the onus on Israel. Moscow has cryptically reported subsequent developments, including the tabling on the 23d of the second joint U.S.-Soviet resolution calling for troop pullbacks to positions held when the cease-fire came into force as well as Egypt's request on the evening of the 24th for Soviet and U.S. forces to supervise the cease-fire.

On the 24th Soviet propaganda began asserting that Security Council members and other "observers" see the Brezhnev-Kissinger agreement in Moscow as having opened the way to a constructive search for a Middle East settlement. But except in carrying the text of the new Resolution 338 on the cease-fire, Soviet media have only indirectly touched on its call for negotiations between the parties and have been silent on possible procedures for carrying out the second operative paragraph calling for "immediate" implementation of Resolution 242 of November 1967.

KOSYGIN TRAVELS, Moscow's first acknowledgment of Kosygin's
KISSINGER IN USSR 16-19 October visit to Cairo came in one-line
items broadcast by the domestic service
and carried by TASS around mid-day on the 19th which noted only
that Kosygin had "had meetings" with as-Sadat. The domestic
service also reported Kosygin's return to Moscow that day. A
broadcast in Arabic on the 20th said that the Egyptian press

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and public opinion, giving much attention to the Kosygin visit, referred to Soviet efforts to achieve a just solution of the crisis. The broadcast attributed to the Czechoslovak news agency a report that the Egyptian press viewed Kosygin's visit as a peace mission.

The visit had been announced by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on the 18th, with Cairo papers providing some details on the 19th: According to AL-AHRAM and AL-AKHBAR, Kosygin was received by as-Sadat on the day of his arrival, and the two met twice on the 17th and twice again on the 18th. AL-AHRAM, as reported by MENA, added that Kosygin twice during the visit went to the Soviet embassy for telephone contacts with Brezhnev.

Cairo radio on the 20th said that Kosygin had visited Damascus en route home from Egypt, and various Arab media reported rumors that he had been in Baghdad on the 21st and had returned to Cairo on the 22d. Moscow said nothing about his movements after the report of his arrival from Cairo on the 19th and gave no explanation of his absence from the 20-21 October talks with Kissinger in Moscow.

Brief reports by TASS and Moscow radio early on the 20th cited the White House for the announcement that Secretary Kissinger had left for Moscow to discuss questions pertaining to the situation in the Middle East, but the reports ignored the White House statement that the trip was at Brezhnev's request. Moscow carried only brief accounts of the Secretary's talks with Brezhnev and Gromyko on the 20th and 21st. And a description of the talks was confined to TASS' formulation on the 21st, repeated in connection with Kissinger's departure the next day, that the situation in the Middle East was examined in detail and possible ways of establishing peace in the area were discussed.

TASS did not characterize the atmosphere of the talks, and in reporting Kissinger's departure statement it merely cited him as saying the discussions were "fruitful" and that in his opinion the resolution adopted by the Security Council that day would facilitate a Middle East settlement. (According to American press accounts of his departure statement, Kissinger said the talks would contribute to peace in the world in general and to a further improvement of Soviet-American relations. He was also quoted in U.S. media as describing the

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talks as "very extensive, very constructive" and held in a "cordial and warm atmosphere.") Both TASS and Moscow's domestic service reported the White House as having announced that Kissinger, at President Nixon's request, would visit Israel en route home "in connection with current efforts aimed at stopping hostilities" and speeding up full implementation of the joint U.S.-Soviet cease-fire resolution. TASS later noted without comment his arrival in Israel, his talks with Prime Minister Meir and Foreign Minister Eban, and his stopover in London for talks at the airport with Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home.

In its propaganda during the first two weeks of the war, Moscow had routinely voiced support for the Arabs' "just cause," but a subtle shift in treatment of the fighting began to be apparent around the 19th--the day Kosygin returned from Cairo and the eve of Kissinger's arrival in the Soviet Union. On the 19th for the first time there were calls for an end to hostilities by routine radio commentators and by Soviet citizens at meetings held to demonstrate support for the Arabs. At the same time, TASS reports from Egypt began to suggest the extent of the Israeli penetration of the west bank of the Suez Canal. On the following two days press comment intimated concern over the military developments, with RED STAR noting that "all kinds of turns of events are still possible." And by the 22d PRAVDA declared that the "protracted nature" of the hostilities "imperatively" dictated the need for a political settlement. Also over the weekend, pickups of reports on U.S. military aid to Israel diminished, the last such monitored references appearing early on the 21st.

JOINT CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION

While the cease-fire resolution was jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States, Moscow made no announcement on its own behalf. Rather, TASS early on the 22d, in a Washington-dated lined dispatch, reported the White House announcement of U.S.-Soviet agreement regarding a joint resolution on cessation of military operations, to be placed before the Security Council late on the 21st. TASS said that White House Press Secretary Ziegler read a brief statement which said the agreement was reached as a result of the Brezhnev-Kissinger talks in Moscow, and that the President had instructed the U.S. representative at the United Nations, together with the Soviet representative, to request prompt convocation of the council.

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Prior to the voting, TASS reported the joint resolution which calls for an in-place cease-fire by all parties 12 hours after adoption of the resolution, for the parties concerned to immediately begin implementation of Resolution 242, and for peace negotiations between the parties "under appropriate auspices" "immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire." Soviet accounts of the Security Council session noted that U.S. delegate Scali described the resolution as a result of the talks in Moscow. Soviet delegate Malik was reported as having stated that it was the council's duty to end the bloodshed and achieve implementation of Resolution 242 providing for withdrawal from "all" occupied Arab territories as a basis for a political settlement. Egyptian agreement on the draft resolution was reported, as was the Israeli representative's statement that his delegation was "positively disposed." Moscow noted that the Chinese delegate, "displaying a lack of interest in a political settlement," did not take part in the voting.

Acceptances of the resolution by Egypt, Israel and Jordan were reported by TASS on the 22d. In noting President as-Sadat's statement of acceptance, TASS said only that the Egyptians took into consideration, among other things, "the talks and contacts with the leaders of the Soviet Union," thus ignoring his references to the "five working sessions" with Kosygin and to "assurances" received from Brezhnev in a "special message" handed over by the Soviet ambassador on the night of the 21st. In reporting Syria's delayed agreement to the cease-fire, a TASS dispatch from the United Nations cited a telegram received by the UN Secretary General. The Damascus announcement, similar to that of Cairo's, in fact said the Syrians had taken into consideration "the results of contacts with the Soviet Union and also the explanations and guarantees secured through these contacts," as well as "the assurances" made to Egypt "which provide guarantees for Arab rights."

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT,
CEASE-FIRE BREAKDOWN

Following TASS reports on the 23d of Egyptian communique, charging Israeli troop redeployment after the cease-fire and of Egypt's request for an emergency session of the Security Council, Moscow issued a government statement placing "full responsibility" on Israel for violation of Resolution 338. The government statement said that Israel's acceptance of the resolution had proved to be a "gross lie,"

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since Israeli troops attacked Egyptian positions as well as "peaceful populated localities."

The statement, while warning of "grave consequences" if Israel continued its "aggression" against Egypt and Syria, did not go so far as to hint at any Soviet action, as did Soviet Government statements of 6 and 7 June 1967 demanding Israeli compliance with cease-fire resolutions. The 6 June statement declared that the Soviet Government "reserves the right to take all steps that may be necessitated" by the situation. The 7 June statement, addressed to Israel, warned that if Israel did not respect the cease-fire the USSR would adopt a decision on maintaining its diplomatic relations with Israel (which were severed by Moscow on the 10th), and that the Soviet Government would also "consider and implement other necessary measures stemming from Israel's aggressive policy."

A second joint resolution tabled by the Soviet Union and the United States at the Security Council on 23 October and adopted--again with Peking the only nonparticipant--was reported by TASS as calling for troop pullbacks to positions held when the cease-fire came into force, but without specifying the troops of either side.* The resolution also recommended that the UN secretary general take measures for immediately sending UN observers to monitor the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire.

A TASS wrap-up of the cease-fire situation on the evening of the 24th cited the Egyptian Government statement of that day as charging Israel with deliberate cease-fire violations. TASS did not mention that the Egyptian statement placed "special responsibility" on the USSR and the United States, as sponsors of the cease-fire resolution, to guarantee its implementation.

CAIRO REQUEST FOR
U.S., SOVIET TROOPS

Moscow media were slow to acknowledge President as-Sadat's request, made on the evening of the 24th, for U.S.

and Soviet forces to supervise the cease-fire. Initial Soviet accounts of the Security Council meeting that night, convened at Egypt's request, said nothing about Egyptian Foreign Minister az-Zayyat's appeal to the Soviet Union and the United States to send forces to supervise implementation of the cease-fire.

* Moscow in an Arabic-language broadcast on the 24th said the council demanded a halt to military operations "begun by Israel" and pullback of "Israeli forces" to positions held when the cease-fire took effect.

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It was not until about 1200 GMT on the 25th that Moscow radio, followed by TASS, quoted Soviet UN delegate Malik as saying that he was "authorized to declare" that "the Egyptian proposal for sending Soviet and U.S. troops to the area of the conflict is fully justified and accords with the UN Charter." TASS cited U.S. delegate Scali as saying, with regard to Egypt's proposal, that "in his opinion the time has not yet come for participation by the great powers and for sending their forces to the cease-fire line." A later TASS report noted that Egyptian Foreign Minister az-Zayyat informed the council that as-Sadat "had appealed to the Soviet Union and the United States" to send troops to the Middle East to safeguard the truce lines.

On the 25th, TASS reported without comment that President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger briefed Congressional leaders that morning on "diplomatic steps being taken" to end the military actions in the Middle East and insure compliance with the cease-fire agreement.

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PEKING ASSAILS CEASE-FIRE AS PRODUCT OF SUPERPOWER "COLLUSION"

Peking has offered no authoritative comment on recent Middle East developments but has publicized speeches by its representatives in the UN Security Council sessions on the Middle East. The PRC delegates, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and permanent UN representative Huang Hua, focused particular invective against Moscow's stance in the course of condemning the cease-fire resolutions as the product of U.S.-Soviet "collusion" to reimpose a "no war, no peace" situation against Arab interests. The Chinese representatives criticized the resolutions for failing to guarantee the return of occupied Arab territory and Palestinian national rights. But they softpedaled most specific issues in the crisis, preferring to play to the large third world gallery by holding up the example of the U.S.-Soviet "condominium" on the Middle East as proof of Peking's contention that superpower detente is invariably achieved at the expense of the interests of smaller states.

Though the United States came in for perfunctory criticism, both PRC delegates reserved their main attacks for the Soviet Union, reiterating Chinese claims that Moscow gives arms to the Arabs only to be better able to control Middle East events. In a particularly harsh rebuttal to Soviet delegate Malik's criticism of the Chinese on 23 October, Huang Hua broadened Chinese charges by asserting that the Soviet Union is stepping up contact with Israel so as to supplant the position of the United States in Tel Aviv.

While Peking had used the UN forum to exploit the theme of super-power collusion, its sole comment on events leading up to the big-power cease-fire arrangement, a 23 October NCNA article, reiterated the Chinese view that the current situation is merely a temporary compromise covering sharpening U.S.-Soviet rivalry. According to the article, Moscow was "intimidated" by U.S. pressure into agreeing to the cease-fire. As evidence, NCNA quoted remarks to the press by Secretary Kissinger pointing to the "great strain" in U.S.-Soviet relations stemming from the war and cited his reference to the crisis as a test of the "real meaning of detente." Quoting Western press reports, NCNA portrayed Kosygin as making his trip to Cairo to urge "restraint on the Arab side" in order to accommodate the United States and pave the way for successful talks by Brezhnev with Kissinger in Moscow.

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The Chinese have discreetly eschewed making any connection between Kissinger's recent activities and the postponement of his scheduled October trip to China, disclosing the change in dates for the visit to 10-13 November in a terse NCNA announcement on 24 October.

EAST EUROPEANS APPROVE TRUCE DECISION, ATTACK VIOLATIONS

In a relatively small volume of comment, Moscow's orthodox East European allies have registered low-keyed satisfaction with the 22 October UN cease-fire resolution. They expressed support for the Arab cause and called on Israel to ensure the success of the truce by withdrawing from all occupied territories. Credit for bringing about the cease-fire was generally given to the Soviet leaders, but it was also noted that the United States was prompted to cooperate by a realization that the balance of power had shifted in favor of the forces of socialism since the 1967 war. Prague, uniquely, charged that Chou En-lai sent messages to the Egyptian and Syrian leaders urging their rejection of the cease-fire resolution and promising material support to their continued struggle.

HUNGARY Budapest comment was notable for its generally favorable treatment of the U.S. role. In the 23 October NEPSZABADSAG, the authoritative foreign affairs commentator Ferenc Varnai viewed "the joint Soviet-American proposal" in the context of the developing Soviet-U.S. detente, which he said has passed its "first important test" and "helped to avert an extremely grave international crisis." The joint action by "the two leading powers of the two world systems" was also hailed in a Budapest radio commentary on the 22d. This commentary credited the cease-fire to the alleged shift in the balance of forces since 1967 and surmised that the United States is "obviously now urging its Israeli ally" to accept the cease-fire and withdraw from the occupied territories.

POLAND Polish leader Gierek, addressing the opening session of his party's conference on the 22d, referred approvingly to the UN Security Council resolution and expressed the hope that a solution to the Middle East situation "may be found" in that action. Going beyond the relatively mild language of the 8 October government statement on the outbreak of the war, Gierek blamed the resumption of hostilities on "the obstinate, aggressive policy of the Israeli government." He also praised the "constructive initiatives" of the Soviet government in bringing about the cease-fire.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA Czechoslovak comment was notable in citing the PRC delegate's abstention from the vote on the Security Council resolution, a Prague domestic service talk on the 22d noting that the Chinese delegate had "again turned his back on a reasonable course." A Prague foreign broadcast the same day conceded, however, that the PRC representative could have vetoed the resolution. The anti-Peking theme was further accented in an interview with a CPCZ official on Prague domestic TV on the 23d. The official charged that, in addition to the abstention in the Security Council, Chou En-lai had also on the 22d sent cables to the Egyptian and Syrian presidents urging them not to accept the cease-fire and "promising them material assistance." The speaker termed it "distressing that similar statements have also been made by certain irresponsible Arab officials," citing in this connection Libyan leader al-Qadhdhafi's opposition to the cease-fire. Such statements, he added, "simply play into the hands of Israel and its obstructionist policy."

On 25 October, Prague issued a government statement--it had issued a party-government statement on the 8th--which expressed "deep satisfaction" over the cease-fire resolution but condemned Israel for alleged violations of both the first and second Security Council resolutions and demanded that Israel withdraw to the 22 October cease-fire line.

GDR The same demands were recorded in a somewhat less vitriolic GDR party-government statement on the 24th, which voiced "great relief and satisfaction" over the 22 October resolution. The GDR had also issued a party-government statement on the 7th. The East Berlin agency ADN carried reports on the 23d on a joint statement of support for the Arab cause by the GDR Solidarity Committee and the GDR-Arab Countries Friendship Society, as well as on a "demand" by State Council Chairman Stoph that Israel implement the 1973 and 1967 Security Council resolutions. The East Berlin domestic service on the 22d reported its Cairo correspondent as noting both satisfaction and caution in the Egyptian capital over the truce, as well as an "unmistakable demand that it must under no circumstances be used by Israel as a cover to continue the policy of occupation."

BULGARIA Sofia media, predictably hailing the cease-fire resolution as a victory for the USSR's peace policy, also carried a declaration on the Middle East situation issued at the windup of the 15-22 October quadrennial congress of the

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World Federation of Trade Unions in Varna, Bulgaria. As reported by BTA, the WFTU declaration did not mention the cease-fire resolution, registering instead a demand for "the immediate discontinuation of Israel's aggression" and its withdrawal from occupied territories.

ROMANIA, ALBANIA, A Romanian government statement on the 24th
YUGOSLAVIA hailed the cease-fire agreement and suggested
the immediate establishment of a 5-kilometer
dividing zone between the opposing forces to ensure implementation
of the cease-fire. A SCINTEIA editorial the same day expressed
satisfaction over the Security Council resolution but noted certain
unspecified "acts of violation" of the truce. Yugoslavia on the
23d issued a foreign secretariat statement which hailed the
council decision as a success for the Arab countries' longstanding
efforts to solve the Middle East situation, without mentioning
either the Soviet Union or the United States. Albania issued no
official statement, but a Tirana domestic service report of the
22d viewed the cease-fire decision as favorable to the interests
of Israel and "the two superpowers" and contrary to those of the
Arab countries.

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MOSCOW APPROVES ARAB EFFORTS TO USE OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON

Since the outbreak of new fighting in the Middle East, the Soviet Union has devoted a moderate level of attention to the Arabs' ability to use oil as a weapon against Western supporters of Israel, noting Western vulnerabilities to such pressure and reporting sympathetically on Arab actions in this regard. Reportage has pointed to U.S. concern over the energy situation, citing the President's statement calling on Americans to conserve fuel to meet energy needs, and at the same time has noted anxiety in Western Europe over dependence on Arab oil and the possibility of fierce competition among capitalist states for petroleum supplies.

A commentary broadcast in Arabic on 17 October linked Washington's military assistance to Israel with the oil question, noting that the U.S. decision had aroused anger among the Arabs, who were forced to use "all means available" in their struggle. It said the question of oil as a weapon was being intensely debated among the Arabs, and concluded that local and foreign policy difficulties facing the United States would increase as Arab resistance to the policy of Israel and its "protectors" increased. An Arabic-language commentary the next day observed that the United States had shrugged off Arab warnings of a halt to Arab export of oil to the United States in retaliation for Washington's pro-Israeli policy; it concluded that should the Arabs use "all means" at their disposal, including oil, they would achieve a speedier success in their struggle.

An article in SOCIALIST INDUSTRY on the 20th said that economists viewed with skepticism Washington's calculations on reducing its energy shortage by means of petroleum imports from the Middle East, since it was precisely in this region that U.S. foreign policy was running into trouble. One of Moscow's major commentators on oil questions, Boris Rachkov, wrote in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA on the 21st that use of oil as a political weapon against imperialism had become an increasingly important trend in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and he found it not surprising that in conditions of a new military outbreak in the Middle East the Arabs had decided to use oil as a weapon against "open and secret" supporters of Israel, putting oil at the service of their economic interests and "quite justifiably" using it for political purposes.

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Soviet media have reported the rash of recent actions by the oil producers, including the price increase by six Persian Gulf members of OPEC, Iraq's nationalization of the two American companies in Basrah Petroleum Company, the decision by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) on reducing oil production, and decisions by some six individual countries to cut all exports to the United States, as well as the most recent bans by at least two producer countries on exports to the Netherlands. All except the first action were cited as protests against support for Israel.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW REJECTS MIDDLE EAST LINKAGE TO CSCE PROSPECTS

In line with its continuing professions of confidence in the viability of detente, Moscow reacted quickly to counter Western comment suggesting that the Arab-Israeli conflict may hinder progress at the Geneva Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Responding to Western news reports of 17-19 October suggesting that Soviet actions in the Middle East may hinder the CSCE work, Moscow attacked what it called attempts by Western states to use the "local aggravation" of the Middle East situation as a "pretext" for slowing down the Geneva negotiations.

Moscow's comment over the past two weeks has argued that, despite alleged Western "artificial obstacles" placed in the way of progress at the talks and demands made on the socialist states for concessions regarding the human contacts issues, the CSCE had finally resolved certain "procedural" questions, and progress was now being achieved in a "businesslike and constructive" atmosphere. PRAVDA's deputy chief editor Nelrasov maintained on Moscow radio on the 14th that regardless of the Western "propaganda ballyhoo" in Geneva the CSCE work "continues and not without success; certain progress has been achieved, procedural questions solved, and all three main commissions have started smooth, practical work."

PRAVDA's international review on the 21st by Ovchinnikov briefly noted that "certain Western politicians" were seeking to portray Soviet support for the Arabs as a "source of international tension" and an "obstacle" to the successful completion of the CSCE negotiations. Moscow radio's international observers program on the 21st discussed the same subject in more detail. Radio/TV political observer Druzhinin asserted that "some Western powers" were attempting to "make use of the situation in the Middle East as a pretext for slowing down the course of the Geneva" talks. Responding, IZVESTIYA's international affairs editor Grigoryants acknowledged that there is an interdependence of events in the world but argued that the relaxation of tension in Europe is the dominant influence affecting the international atmosphere, not the Middle East conflict. He also added that the "majority of the delegates" in Geneva were working to prevent the Middle East conflict from influencing the work of the CSCE.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW DETAILS CASE, SEEKS CONTAINMENT OF DISPUTE

The authoritative 16 October PRAVDA editorial article on the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party reaffirmed Moscow's gloomy assessment of its relationship with Peking. The article represents the capstone of a highly visible campaign that Moscow has mounted to defend its position in the world communist movement and its newly won image in the West against criticism by Peking. As part of that campaign, Moscow has in recent weeks given extensive critical play to Chinese attitudes toward the Chilean coup and the renewed fighting in the Middle East.

At the same time, however, Moscow has seemed anxious to prevent an exacerbation of the dispute. That anxiety has been evident in the moderate tone of recent authoritative statements on China and in the renewed offer to normalize relations with Peking on the basis of peaceful coexistence, an offer first made by Brezhnev in March 1972. It has also been evident in an increasing public stress on Lenin's dictum on the indivisibility of peace, a theme pointedly raised by Brezhnev at Tashkent.

PRAVDA ARTICLE The PRAVDA editorial article represents the most comprehensive Soviet public assessment of the Chinese congress, echoing in greater detail the basic pessimistic judgment of earlier assessments, including Brezhnev's in his 24 September Tashkent speech, on the prospects for an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. It also followed Brezhnev's lead in contrasting a flexible Soviet stance against a rigid Chinese posture in the dispute. It repeated Brezhnev's suggestion of Soviet receptivity to action by Peking consistent with Cheu En-lai's observation at the congress that the two countries' differences "should not prevent the normalization of relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence" and that "border issues between China and the Soviet Union must be settled peacefully by negotiation under conditions ruling out any threat."

The article repeated the charge contained in the two Aleksandrov articles in August that Peking "is becoming" an ally of imperialism, but in couching the accusation in the present tense the article stopped short of irrevocably reading Peking out of the communist movement. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the article interpreted the somewhat different wording of the congress' formulations on "imperialism" as contradictory and as evidence of leadership disputes in Peking over relations with the West.

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The PRAVDA article and other recent articles have shed some new light on past Soviet proposals for breaking the deadlock in state relations--in addition to the January 1971 proposal on nonuse of force first disclosed by Brezhnev in March 1972 and the June 1973 nonaggression treaty proposal revealed by him at Tashkent. The recent disclosures indicate that Moscow had proposed further summit meetings following the Konygin-Chou meeting in the aftermath of border flareups in 1969 and had offered to reaffirm the pledges contained in the 1950 Friendship Treaty. An article in the 5 October NEW TIMES by G. Nikolayev revealed that Moscow had made a number of other proposals as well, including one calling for "the activization of health, sport and friendship society ties."

INDIVISIBILITY OF PEACE

Apparently in reaction to Western overtures to improve relations with Peking, Brezhnev in his Tashkent speech cautioned "certain politicians" against attempts to exploit the "abnormal" state of relations between China and the Soviet Union. Brezhnev's warning prompted a series of commentaries stressing the harmful consequences for third countries of an exacerbation of Sino-Soviet relations, and this theme was stressed in the PRAVDA editorial article as well. It was amplified by Nikolayev, in the NEW TIMES article, who said that "in the present situation the significance of Soviet-Chinese relations goes beyond the framework of normal ties between two states. Nobody can remain indifferent to the question of the direction in which relations between the two great powers will develop." Ernst Henry, in the 3 October LITERARY GAZETTE, addressed the warning directly to the United States in a criticism of U.S. writers who have played up the threat of a Soviet nuclear strike against China. "It is a crude piece of self-deception," Henry observed, "to reckon nowadays on the possibility of bringing foreign powers into conflict with each other while remaining aloof from the world conflict oneself."

Brezhnev's stress on the indivisibility of peace may also be addressed to elements in the Soviet hierarchy convinced that achievement of detente in the West will free Moscow to pursue an aggressive policy in the East. Brezhnev personally rejected such a linkage when he declared in Tashkent that "one cannot pronounce oneself an adherent of detente in one part of the world and fan the sparks of tension and mistrust in the other." Nikolayev in the NEW TIMES article likewise expressed recognition that a flareup of the Sino-Soviet dispute could affect the whole

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structure of Moscow's detente diplomacy: "Today wherever a hotbed of tension may emerge, it will inevitably reflect on the political atmosphere of the entire world." In a similar vein Henry suggested that Moscow's renewed interest in Asian collective security indicated that "the ending of the cold war in one corner of the earth's surface does not mean that it must immediately be rekindled in another."

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DRV MILITARY COMMENTATOR "CHIEN BINH" SCORES U.S. POLICIES

The North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 22 October began to publish a series of articles by the military commentator "Chien Binh" (Combatant) which reiterated in strong terms Hanoi's concern over U.S. policies aimed at exploiting divisions in the communist camp. On the 24th Hanoi radio announced that the "three-part" series, entitled "The Present Strategic Problems of the U.S. Imperialists," would be broadcast in installments. The radio described the three parts as discussing U.S. global strategy, its withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and its buildup of local forces to compensate for troop withdrawals under the Nixon Doctrine. The issues of QUAN DOI NHAN DAN are not yet available, but VNA's daily press reviews indicate that three parts of the article had been published as of 25 October.

Hanoi radio on the 24th and 25th broadcast what it described as the first two installments, apparently comprising the first part of the series. Chien Binh set out to analyze U.S. global policy since World War II and, specifically, to expose the "grand U.S. strategic design of splitting the socialist camp and taking full advantage of the contradictions between the USSR and China." While Hanoi commentaries in the past year have occasionally decried alleged U.S. efforts to take advantage of divisions among revolutionary forces in the world, the extent and vehemence of Chien Binh's attack has not been matched by any such comment at least since an article by Central Committee member Hoang Quoc Viet in the December 1972 issue of the party journal HOC TAP.

It is possible that the Chien Binh series was originally intended to coincide with Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking which had been scheduled to begin on 26 October; and it is notable that it was, in fact, released at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in great power diplomacy over the Arab-Israeli war. Hanoi media did not report the announcement of Kissinger's plans to visit China, but the 24 October cancellation of the visit due to the Middle East crisis was reported by Hanoi on the following day. Hanoi was quick to call attention to U.S.-Soviet contacts, reporting Kissinger's trip to Moscow the day after his arrival. Hanoi also reported, without comment, the passage of the joint U.S.-Soviet resolution in the UN Security Council on the 22d, noting that China did not take part in the vote.

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BACKGROUND Chien Binh, a pseudonym used to sign authoritative military commentaries usually appearing in the army newspaper, has not appeared since 4 August last year when an article under his byline derided the failure of the U.S. Vietnamization policy during the spring 1972 communist offensive. Once a frequent contributor of post-mortem examinations of military campaigns and articles on Vietnamization, Chien Binh only appeared in print twice in 1972 and four times in 1971. His commentaries have ordinarily favored an aggressive military strategy in South Vietnam and have included some notable arguments for the employment of large-unit tactics. Thus, for example, he maintained in June 1966 that conditions in the South had developed "for the main liberation forces to have a free hand." And in an April 1971 discussion of Saigon's Operation Lam Son 719 he stressed the "great importance" of "big campaigns of annihilation" by the communist forces.

As in the current series of articles, Chien Binh has occasionally departed from strictly military topics to deal with broad policy issues. One of his most notable departures was a series of six articles on overall U.S. policy toward Vietnam published in October 1969 following the death of Ho Chi Minh. The fourth of these articles depicted the Nixon Administration as eager to take advantage of whatever "confusion" and "discord" that might exist in Hanoi after Ho's death. Chien Binh denied any such internal North Vietnamese disunity but, in a discussion of foreign support for Vietnam, he made the frank admission that there has been "discord between fraternal parties" in the international communist movement.

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PHAM VAN DONG RESUMES EAST EUROPEAN TOUR IN THE GDR

A DRV party-government delegation paid an "official visit" to East Germany from 18 to 23 October, resuming an interrupted swing through East Europe which began last summer with trips to Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.* The delegation, headed by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong and including Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, departed from Berlin on the 23rd for Prague, and will go to Albania on the next leg of the tour which has been billed as fulfilling Ho Chi Minh's behest in his will to visit and thank countries which provided aid during the Vietnam war. Prior to his arrival in East Berlin, Pham Van Dong made stopovers in Moscow on the 17th, where he was met by Mazurov and Katushev, and in Peking on the 16th where, in a departure from standard procedure, Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien rather than Chou En-lai greeted him. Chou had received Dong on his last stopover on 16 August, when the DRV premier was returning from his earlier tour of East Europe.

GDR Premier Sindermann hosted the DRV delegation during the East German visit which included the standard banquets, rally speeches, and tour of historic sites. Dong was received on the 18th by First Secretary Honecker and State Council Chairman Stoph. Following the pattern of the communiques signed earlier in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, the DRV-GDR communique stated East Germany's "full support" for Hanoi's stand demanding compliance by Saigon and the United States with the peace agreement, and for the PRG's 28 June six-point proposal for a political settlement in South Vietnam. The communique did not mention violations of the agreement; but First Secretary Honecker, in remarks on the 18th, and Premier Sindermann, in a rally speech on the 22nd, condemned Saigon violations and charged U.S. complicity. The communique contained no statement that the two sides had reached unanimity of views on all the subjects discussed; however, East German comment on the visit has claimed the communique expressed the "complete agreement" reached on the bilateral and international problems

* Dong's visits to Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria were discussed, respectively, in the TRENDS of 25 July 1973, pages 3-6, 1 August 1973, page 20, and 15 August 1973, pages 3-5.

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discussed during the negotiations. The relations between the two parties were characterized as being based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism--a formulation previously used in the Romanian communique, but not in the joint documents on Pham Van Dong's other East European visits.

A discrepancy between the DRV and the GDR accounts of the joint communique appeared to reflect disagreement over the status of the PRG. VNA's account of the communique indicated that it contained East German acknowledgement of the PRG as the "sole authentic representative" of the South Vietnamese people. By contrast, the text of the communique published in the 23 October issue of NEUES DEUTSCHLAND omitted the word "sole," labeling the PRG as the "true representative." A similar discrepancy emerged last April when Moscow media omitted the word "sole" in reporting a Soviet communique with PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh.* The appearance of the standard Vietnamese communist formula on the PRG in the DRV's joint communiqués with Moscow and its allies this summer had seemed to indicate that an understanding had been reached on this issue; however, the Soviets and all the East Europeans except the Romanians had used more cautious language stating that the PRG was the only authentic "expressor" of the aspirations of the South Vietnamese.

AID AGREEMENTS The communique contained an extensive list of promised East German aid, including help in restoring projects constructed by the GDR in the past and the supply of industrial equipment, means of transportation, building and agricultural machines, and electrical equipment. Two long-term agreements, which ADN said were signed by Pham Van Dong, involved assistance in reconstructing the city of Vinh, during 1974-1978, and cooperation in vocational training for Vietnamese in the GDR, during 1973-1979. (The aid agreements in other East European countries had been signed by DRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi who did not accompany Dong on his current tour.) Pham Van Dong, in an 18 October reception speech, thanked the East Germans for their decision, announced on 3 August, to cancel previous DRV debts.

* See TRENDS of 11 April 1973, page 9.

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The joint communique made no reference to military aid, although VNA reported that the agreements signed in East Berlin on 22 October included "economic and military aid." Joint documents at the conclusion of the DRV visits to Moscow and Warsaw had similarly not mentioned military aid agreements, but Hanoi had reported that such an agreement was concluded in Poland.

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NOTES

PRC-DRV TRADE ACCORD: NCNA on 19 October reported the signing in Peking that day of the annual Sino-Vietnamese agreement on the "mutual supply of goods and payments" for 1974, and protocols covering PRC supply of "general goods" in 1974 and aid in the form of "complete projects." The report's only notable departure from NCNA coverage of signing ceremonies concerning similar agreements for 1973 and 1972 was that it dropped previous specification that the two aid protocols were in accordance with the annual PRC-DRV "economic and military assistance" agreement, which this year was signed on 8 June. As usual, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien led Chinese officials at the signing and had a "friendly and cordial" talk with the leader of the Vietnamese delegation Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Nguyen Chanh, who was substituting for the usual DRV envoy at such occasions.

POLISH PARTY CONFERENCE: Focusing heavily on domestic economic concerns, the First National Conference of the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) on 22-23 October served the main purpose of providing an escape valve for persistent popular grievances over shortages and high prices of consumer goods. The device of a party conference, falling between full-fledged congresses, has been used in recent years only by the Romanians and Yugoslavs. Following the recent practice of the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and East German parties, Polish party chief Gierek announced in his opening conference report that an exchange of party cards would be undertaken and completed before the next PZPR congress. Noting that seven years had elapsed since the last such exchange, Gierek emphasized that the exchange was occasioned primarily by "political and ideological" reasons. He placed notable stress on "unity" in his speech at the end of the conference, and TRYBUNA LUDU gave the gathering an orthodox stamp by lavishly endorsing the Soviet detente policy and "Leonid Brezhnev personally," as well as upholding the indivisibility of patriotism and internationalism.

PRC-TAIWAN: According to NCNA on 23 October, PRC radio stations in Fukien on 1 October began twice daily reports on weather and sea conditions for the "convenience and safety of compatriot fishermen of Taiwan province at sea." This appears to be another

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Chinese effort to win favor with the fishermen. Last spring Peking radio broadcasts to Taiwan had begun reporting successful rescue efforts by mainlanders of endangered Taiwan fishermen. These reports noted in particular the "affectionate" and "warm" reception received by the Taiwan anglers while on the mainland and the prompt arrangements made for their return to Taiwan.

WORLD PEACE CONGRESS: The communist-front World Congress of Peace Forces convened in Moscow on 25 October with the major surprise being Brezhnev's failure to address the meeting as predicted. Moscow media had been reporting that he had been invited to speak, and a TANJUG broadcast on the 24th had stated that he would speak. Romesh Chandra, the secretary general of the congress, in his opening address to the congress indicated that the speech had been postponed but not cancelled and that Brezhnev might address the meeting later. TANJUG on the 25th reported speculation that the speech had been postponed because of the Middle East situation. Brezhnev appeared along with a large group of other Soviet leaders in the government box at the opening ceremonies of the congress. At the last such congress held in Moscow, in 1962, Khrushchev gave the major address.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15 - 21 OCTOBER 1973

<u>Moscow (2809 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1028 items)</u>		
Middle East	(22%)	19%	Domestic Issues	(30%)	46%
China	(6%)	13%	Middle East	(37%)	23%
[PRAVDA Editorial	(--)	7%]	Indochina	(7%)	7%
Article			[Cambodian UN	(3%)	4%]
Chilean Coup	(11%)	6%	Membership		
October Revolution	(1%)	5%	Thailand	(--)	6%
56th Anniversary			Canadian Prime Minister	(13%)	3%
World Peace Congress in	(3%)	4%	Trudeau in PRC		
Moscow, 25-31 Oct.			Edgar Snow Burial in	(--)	3%
8th World Trade Unions	(1%)	3%	Peking		
Congress, Bulgaria					
Danish Premier	(--)	3%			
Jorgensen in USSR					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.